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EVALUATING INSTITUTIONAL PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 
LITIGATION:  COSTS AND BENEFITS AND FEDERALISM 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Sarah Vandenbraak Hart∗ 
I am grateful to the symposium sponsors for inviting me here to-
day.  I have been asked to comment on the costs and benefits of pris-
oner litigation looking especially at a recent class action, Bowers v. City 
of Philadelphia,1 as a case study.  My comments here are, in large part, 
based on my experiences as a criminal justice practitioner, as a gov-
ernment lawyer in Bowers who also represented state and local offi-
cials in prison conditions lawsuits, and as someone who has worked 
with criminal justice stakeholders to address major criminal justice 
policy issues.2 
To determine whether litigation has benefits or costs requires val-
ue judgments.  The parties in litigation usually have diametrically op-
posed points of view—plaintiffs see a large monetary verdict as a posi-
tive benefit; defendants see it as a cost.  But prison litigation and its 
costs and benefits ultimately raise important public policy questions:  
what are our goals with prisons and the management of prisoners, 
and how can we best achieve them?  In this context, is prison litiga-
tion the best and most cost-effective way to achieve important public 
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Lynne Abraham and has represented the Pennsylvania District Attorney’s Association in 
obtaining prison reform legislation in Pennsylvania, 2008 Pa. Laws Acts 81–84.  She pre-
viously served as the Director of the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department 
of Justice and Chief Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.  She pro-
vided substantial assistance to the U.S. Congress in drafting the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act and its amendments.  She is a graduate of Rutgers School of Law and the University 
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   I am grateful to my colleagues, Priya Travassos and Ronald Eisenberg, for their help-
ful comments.  I am also grateful to my former colleague, Dr. Edwin Zedlewski, an econo-
mist with the National Institute of Justice, for his suggestions.  
 1 No. 06-CV-3229, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) (this case settled as 
the Article went to press; the Article reflects the situation in place before the settlement). 
 2 Although I currently represent Lynne Abraham in litigation involving the Philadelphia 
jails, my statements in this Article are attributable solely to me and do not necessarily rep-
resent the official position of the District Attorney, the District Attorney’s Office, or the 
City of Philadelphia. 
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policy goals?  For this reason, we should attempt to understand and 
assess the forces that drive prisoner lawsuits, the various effects of liti-
gation, and their costs and benefits in a public policy context. 
In this Article, I will attempt to discuss these issues in the context 
of large institutional lawsuits involving prisons.3  As I will explain lat-
er, I believe that there needs to be better public and financial ac-
countability for the expenditure of state and local taxpayer funds that 
underwrite private rights of action.  The types of government controls 
that usually apply to government programs are virtually nonexistent 
for attorney fee awards.  Quite simply, the standards for awarding fees 
against state and local governments do not take into account funda-
mental economic questions that need to be asked.  Without this type 
of analysis, we fail to ensure that our system protects constitutional 
rights in a cost-effective way that allows government resources to 
achieve their greatest social utility. 
I.  GENERAL PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 
With most public policy choices, public officials engage in various 
forms of analysis—some very formal and others more intuitive.  De-
scribed simply, they make a value judgment about what goals gov-
ernment should try to achieve, identify operational alternatives for 
achieving a particular goal, weigh the pros and cons of those alterna-
tives, and (ideally) choose the best option (or combination of op-
tions). 
 
 3 In this Article, I am focusing on institutional prisoner litigation.  These lawsuits are usu-
ally filed by attorneys and are often pursued as class actions.  Commonly, these large law-
suits seek monetary damages, injunctions (preliminary and permanent), declaratory 
judgments, and attorneys’ fees.  Major class actions seeking systemic prison reforms are 
often filed by groups of lawyers experienced in prisoner litigation. 
   Common institutional claims often arise under the Eighth Amendment.  These 
claims, which can be raised by sentenced prisoners, frequently involve conditions of con-
finement, the failure to protect, medical treatment, and use of force.  Claims by pretrial 
detainees (who have not been convicted of a crime) are often similar but arise under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  
Other common prisoner claims involving state or local correctional facilities include:  (1) 
Fourteenth Amendment claims under due process (substantive or procedural) or equal 
protection theories; (2) free exercise claims under the First Amendment, see, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006) (protecting religious exercise for institutionalized persons un-
der the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000); Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78 (1987); (3) claims relating to free speech and retaliation, see, e.g., Mt. Healthy 
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 
378 (6th Cir. 1999); (4) access to courts, see, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); and 
(5) Fourth Amendment claims, see, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
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Because government officials inevitably face limited economic re-
sources when they make these choices, there are various forms of 
economic analyses that have become a part of this process.  In some 
public policy areas (such as health care and government programs 
subject to the federal regulatory process), there are very structured 
approaches to these issues. 
For example, when the United States was faced with skyrocketing 
health care costs, economic analyses became a well-accepted manner 
for making difficult health care choices.  While stakeholders certainly 
debated about what analyses to use, the need for ethical limits on the 
financial equations, and how to value particular outcomes, no one se-
riously questioned the need for assessing the costs and benefits of 
particular medical options and the need to determine whether more 
cost-effective options could be used to achieve the same positive re-
sults. 
Economic analyses are also a part of our federal regulatory proc-
ess.  Federal regulations require federal agencies to undertake eco-
nomic analyses as part of their rule-making process.  We consider 
economic impact with regard to environmental regulation, work 
safety, and education.4  While many legal scholars debate the fairness 
or wisdom of particular approaches, no one seems to seriously argue 
that the economic analyses are irrelevant to public policy choices. 
These types of economic analyses are also making their way into 
criminal justice policy.  The Home Office in Great Britain has a well-
structured program for assessing the effectiveness of particular crimi-
nal justice interventions.5  These assessments judge what interventions 
actually work to reduce crime.  In addition, the Home Office rou-
tinely employs economic analyses to help guide policy makers about 
which interventions are the most cost-effective way to achieve crime 
reduction goals.6  International criminology research is also focusing 
 
 4 Henry M. Levin, Waiting for Godot:  Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Education, in EVALUATION 
FINDINGS THAT SURPRISE:  NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION, No. 90 (Richard J. Light ed., 
2001), available at http://www.cbcse.org/media/download_gallery/Waiting%20for%20
Godot.pdf. 
 5 The Home Office has undertaken extensive efforts to assess the various economic issues 
relevant to criminal justice policy.  See, e.g., SAM BRAND & RICHARD PRICE, BRIT. HOME 
OFFICE, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 217:  THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF CRIME 
(2000), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors217.pdf. 
 6 The Home Office provides standardized economic assessment tools relating to cost analy-
sis.  See Brit. Home Office, Crime Reduction Toolkits:  Cost Analysis, http://www.crime
reduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/toolkits/p0318.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  This eco-
nomic analysis work has been used in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., ROGER BOWLES & 
RIMAWAN PRADIPTYO, BRIT. HOME OFFICE, REDUCING BURGLARY INITIATIVE:  AN ANALYSIS 
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on these economic questions.7  In addition, governments in the Unit-
ed States are also now moving towards the use of economic analyses 
to evaluate criminal justice policies and practices.8 
These types of economic analyses can be used to assess legal ser-
vices.  For example, corporations needing legal services engage in 
these types of assessments.9  The federal government likewise assesses 
the legal services supported by federal funds.10 
II.  PROTECTING PRISONERS’ CIVIL RIGHTS 
For the most part, we accept that public tax dollars and govern-
ment resources should be spent on prisons and offenders in order to 
support various public policy goals.  For example, we accept that 
prisons are needed to support important public safety and the crimi-
nal justice system goals.  Prisons are used for the detention of persons 
awaiting trial (to ensure their appearance for court hearings).  We al-
 
OF COSTS, BENEFITS AND COST EFFECTIVENESS (2004), available at http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/rdsolr4304.pdf (using the analysis to assess burglary reduction initia-
tives); LESLIE DAVIDSON ET AL., BRIT. HOME OFFICE, REDUCING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE . . . WHAT WORKS?  HEALTH SERVICES (2000), available at http://www.home
office.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/health.pdf (using the analysis in domestic violence reduction 
efforts); MARTIN GILL ET AL., BRIT. HOME OFFICE, TECHNICAL ANNEX:  METHODS USED IN 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CCTV (2005), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov. uk/rds/
pdfs05/rdsolr1705.pdf (using the analysis to assess crime reduction technologies). 
 7 See, e.g., BRANDON C. WELSH ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PREVENTING CRIME (2001). 
 8 On the national level, the National Institute of Justice now supports some economic ana-
lyses of a variety of criminal justice programs.  See, e.g., SHELLY L. JACKSON, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, A RESOURCE FOR EVALUATING CHILD ADVOCACY CENTERS, at app. A-1–3 (2004), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/192825.pdf (presenting an economic 
analysis of child advocacy centers).  On the state level, Washington has a sophisticated 
mechanism for evaluating criminal justice programs and the related economic questions 
through the Washington State Institute for Public Policy.  See Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy, http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 9 For a discussion of the ways corporations can ensure cost-effective legal services, see Cor-
porate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association, Report on Cost-Effective Man-
agement of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 263 (1995). 
 10 For example, the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) was established by Congress to pro-
vide legal services for the poor.  Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996–2996l (2006)).  LSC supports 
legal assistance in civil matters to low-income people throughout the United States by 
making grants to local legal service providers.  LSC and its grantees are audited by the 
LSC Inspector General.  See Legal Servs. Corp., LSC Office of the Inspector General, 
https://www.oig.lsc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (describing the work of the LSC In-
spector General).  In addition, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) conducts 
assessments of LSC grants programs to ensure fiscal accountability and effectiveness.  See, 
e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LEGAL SERVS. CORP.:  IMPROVED INTERNAL 
CONTROLS NEEDED IN GRANTS MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT (2007), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0837.pdf. 
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so use prisons as a sentencing option to incapacitate offenders (so 
they cannot commit future crimes in the community), to deter of-
fenders (to deter the individual offender from committing more 
crime and to use the example of incarceration to deter others from 
committing crime), for rehabilitation (so offenders are less likely to 
offend again upon release), and retribution (to punish offenders for 
past misconduct).  We have also moved toward using prisons to sup-
port restorative justice goals such as restitution collection and of-
fender-victim encounters.11  While there is often vociferous public de-
bate about who should be in prison and for how long, federal, state, 
and local policymakers will usually support these general incarcera-
tion goals. 
A.  Federal Efforts to Protect Constitutional Rights for Prisoners 
The federal government has repeatedly determined that state and 
local prisoners should be treated fairly and humanely, and that the 
constitutional rights of prisoners should be enforced.  The federal 
government supports this important goal through a variety of means. 
The federal government, for example, has provided financial sup-
port to professional organizations in corrections, such as the Ameri-
can Correctional Association, which has established a strong accredi-
tation program for correctional institutions and the treatment of 
prisoners.12  Through the National Institute of Corrections, the fed-
eral government supports extensive training and technical assistance 
for state and local corrections officials.13  The federal government al-
so supports corrections research through the National Institute of 
Justice.14  Recently, Congress established the National Prison Rape 
Elimination Commission, which studies state and local government 
practices relating to sexual assaults in correction and detention facili-
 
 11 There is no single commonly accepted definition of restorative justice.  For a description 
of the variety of definitions encompassed by this term, see National Institute of Justice, 
Working Definitions of Restorative Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/courts/
restorative-justice/definitions1.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 12 For a sample of the types of federal grants awarded, see American Correctional Associa-
tion, Training, http://www.aca.org/development/grants.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2008), 
which describes the federal grants for training and technical assistance for juvenile deten-
tion centers. 
 13 The National Institute of Corrections website provides detailed information about its fed-
erally funded activities.  National Institute of Corrections, http://www.nicic.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 14 For a detailed description of various research, publications, and training for state and 
local corrections agencies through the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Institute of 
Justice, see National Institute of Justice, www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
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ties, and makes recommendations designed to prevent rape in adult 
and juvenile facilities.15  In addition, the federal government, through 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, provides statistical information relat-
ing to state and local correctional facilities and prisoners.16 
The United States Department of Justice also supports the civil 
rights of prisoners through the Civil Rights Division.17  Under the 
Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), it conducts 
investigations and brings civil actions against prisons and jails that 
commit constitutional violations.18 
For all of these federally supported efforts, there are measures of 
oversight.  In addition to normal managerial oversight, there are a 
number of accountability measures designed to review the work and 
cost-effectiveness of these efforts.  These include budget processes 
and other accountability measures.  On the executive branch side, 
there are direct management supervision, budget processes, and ex-
ternal reviews.19  In addition, Congress itself has significant control 
 
 15 Congress created the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission through the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15608 (2006)).  The activities of the Commission are described on its 
website.  See National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, http://www.nprec.us (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 16 The Bureau of Justice Statistics collects statistics on a wide variety of criminal justice top-
ics.  Some of its reports relate directly to issues involving inmate health and safety.  See, 
e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE IN 
STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/shsplj.pdf.  To review the Bureau’s extensive statistical information relating to state 
and local corrections, see Bureau of Justice Statistics, Corrections Statistics, http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 17 As explained on its website, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice was 
established in 1957 and enforces federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of race, sex, disability, religion, and national origin.  U.S. Department of Justice, Civil 
Rights Division Activities and Programs (2006 Edition), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
activity.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  These laws prohibit discrimination in a wide vari-
ety of areas including education, employment, credit, housing, public accommodations 
and facilities, and voting.  See id. 
 18 The Civil Rights Division also has specific responsibilities relating to the civil rights of per-
sons confined in state and local correctional facilities.  Under the Civil Rights of Institu-
tionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997j (2006), the Attorney General is author-
ized to file civil actions seeking relief for adults and juveniles confined in prisons, jails, 
and juvenile facilities.  The Civil Rights Division has also conducted investigations relating 
to the physical safety of inmates (including physical and sexual abuse by staff or inmates, 
fire-safety, sanitation, and the spread of dangerous communicable diseases, such as tuber-
culosis); medical care; mental health services; and access to courts.  See Civil Rights Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/jails.htm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2008). 
 19 For example, the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) is authorized to review activi-
ties of U.S. Department of Justice components, including the Civil Rights Division.  The 
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over the priorities and budget of the executive branch.  Congress 
must pass annual budgets that provide for funding and staffing these 
efforts.  It also has the power to conduct oversight hearings and re-
quire reports from various agencies.20  Both Congress and the execu-
tive branch have significant involvement in how much funding and 
staff should be allocated to these efforts and whether they will con-
tinue to support efforts that have neither demonstrated adequate per-
formance nor been managed cost-effectively. 
The Civil Rights Division, which is the federal entity directly re-
sponsible for enforcing the civil rights of prisoners, is subject to ex-
tensive oversight.  As part of the oversight process, the Civil Rights 
Division provides annual reports to Congress on its CRIPA activities.21  
These reports must also address the financial impact of the Division’s 
 
OIG conducts independent investigations, audits, and reviews to detect and deter waste 
and promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.  See Office of the Inspector General, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
   The normal federal budget development process likewise requires an accounting of 
work performed in these areas.  For example, the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) uses the “Program Assessment Rating Tool” (“PART”) to assess and improve 
program performance.  OMB explains the purpose of the PART review as follows: 
A PART review helps identify a program’s strengths and weaknesses to inform 
funding and management decisions aimed at making the program more effective.  
The PART therefore looks at all factors that affect and reflect program perform-
ance including program purpose and design; performance measurement, evalua-
tions, and strategic planning; program management; and program results.  Be-
cause the PART includes a consistent series of analytical questions, it allows 
programs to show improvements over time, and allows comparisons between simi-
lar programs. 
  Office of Management and Budget, Assessing Program Performance, http://www.white
house.gov/omb/part (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
   The general legal activities of the U.S. Department of Justice, which include civil 
rights enforcement through the Civil Rights Division, have been assessed using this tool.  
See ExpectMore.gov, Detailed Information on the Department of Justice General Legal 
Activities Assessment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003800.20
05.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 20 For examples of the types of oversight hearings Congress conducts to review the work of 
the Civil Rights Division, see Comm. on the Judiciary, Hearings for the 110th Congress, 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/legislation.html (last visited Nov. 5. 2008) (listing 
scheduled oversight hearings, several of which involve the Civil Rights Division’s anti-
employment discrimination efforts), and Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 114–23 (2006) (prepared statement of Wan J. 
Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/28342.pdf. 
 21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997f (2006).  To find the Civil Rights Division’s Annual Reports to Con-
gress (“CRIPA Reports”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997f, see Civil Rights Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Special Litigation Section:  Documents and Publications, http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
  
80 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
work on state and local governments, as well as the types of assistance 
the Division has provided to state and local governments.22 
As with all government resource allocations and policy choices, 
elected leaders are ultimately answerable to the electorate.  If the 
voters do not accept the policy and funding decisions of the executive 
and legislative branches, they retain the right to elect new leaders 
with different priorities. 
III.  FEDERALLY CREATED, BUT LOCALLY FUNDED, PRIVATE RIGHTS OF 
ACTION 
In addition to the direct funding and support of efforts designed 
to ensure constitutional conditions in state and local correctional fa-
cilities, Congress also created private rights of action through the Civ-
il Rights Act.  By empowering private citizens to file such actions in 
federal courts, Congress hoped that they would act as “private attor-
ney[s] general,” helping to ensure that state and local government 
officials complied with the Constitution.23  To support this goal, Con-
gress also provided powerful financial incentives:  plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who prevailed in civil rights litigation would be entitled to reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.  These fees, however, would not be paid by the federal 
government.  Rather, they would be paid for by the state and local 
governments, and ultimately, the state and local taxpayers.  In es-
 
 22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997f.  This statutory provision specifically provides: 
The Attorney General shall include in the report to Congress on the business 
of the Department of Justice prepared pursuant to section 522 of title 28— 
(1) a statement of the number, variety, and outcome of all actions instituted 
pursuant to this subchapter including the history of, precise reasons for, and pro-
cedures followed in initiation or intervention in each case in which action was 
commenced; 
(2) a detailed explanation of the procedures by which the Department has re-
ceived, reviewed and evaluated petitions or complaints regarding conditions in in-
stitutions; 
(3) an analysis of the impact of actions instituted pursuant to this subchapter, 
including, when feasible, an estimate of the costs incurred by States and other po-
litical subdivisions; 
(4) a statement of the financial, technical, or other assistance which has been 
made available from the United States to the State in order to assist in the correc-
tion of the conditions which are alleged to have deprived a person of rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the Unit-
ed States; and 
(5) the progress made in each Federal institution toward meeting existing 
promulgated standards for such institutions or constitutionally guaranteed min-
ima. 
  Id. 
 23 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) (discussing the 
“private attorney general” concept). 
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sence, attorneys’ fees in civil rights actions were created as unfunded 
mandates. 
Notably, this civil rights attorney fee system differs greatly from 
the system established by Congress to enforce the rights of prisoners 
confined in federal prisons.  The Federal Tort Claims Act caps attor-
neys’ fees at 25% of any judgment (20% if the case is settled).24  
Those legal fees are deducted from the plaintiff’s recovery; the Unit-
ed States does not cover any part of a prevailing plaintiff’s legal ex-
penses.25  There is no separate provision of attorneys’ fees for civil 
rights claims filed as Bivens actions26 or under the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act (“EAJA”).27 
 
 
 
 24 The relevant provision of the Federal Torts Claims Act provides the following for actions 
filed under the Act: 
No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or collect for services rendered, 
fees in excess of 25 per centum of any judgment rendered pursuant to [28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)] or any settlement made pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 2677], or in excess of 
20 per centum of any award, compromise, or settlement made pursuant to [28 
U.S.C. § 2672]. 
Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered 
in connection with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this sec-
tion, if recovery be had, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not 
more than one year, or both. 
  28 U.S.C. § 2678 (2006). 
 25 For an explanation of these provisions, see Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc) (describing attorney fee system in civil rights cases). 
 26 These constitutional claims can be filed as “Bivens actions.”  See Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (authorizing federal 
rights of action for constitutional violations committed by federal agents).  However, 
plaintiffs filing Bivens actions are not entitled to attorneys’ fees comparable to those 
awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (rejecting equity argument that the federal government should pay attorneys’ 
fees in this Bivens action); Hall v. United States, 773 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 1985) (joining 
the “overwhelming majority of courts” in rejecting claims that federal government in Bi-
vens action should be liable for attorneys’ fees “to the same extent” that state and local 
governments are liable for attorneys’ fees in civil rights actions); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. 
Supp. 1318, 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (“The Constitution does not require that claims as-
serted under Bivens and those asserted under § 1983 [of the Civil Rights Act] be treated 
identically.”). 
 27 28 U.S.C. § 2412 provides attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties.  The EAJA specifically ex-
cludes fees for tort cases.  28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006).  In addition, courts have un-
iformly held that this provision does not apply in Bivens actions against individual officers.  
Kreines, 33 F.3d at 1109 (holding that attorneys’ fees are not available under the EAJA for 
Bivens action); Hall, 773 F.2d at 707 (same); Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 641 
(8th Cir. 1985) (“Congress could have clearly made the United States liable for fees in 
constitutional deprivation actions but chose not to do so.”); Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 
669 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that attorneys’ fees are not available for constitutional 
claims against defendants sued in their individual capacities). 
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A.  Attorneys’ Fees in Prisoner Litigation Against State and Local 
Governments and Officials28 
The traditional “American Rule” provides that the parties in litiga-
tion bear their own litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.29  Congress 
changed this in civil rights actions when it directed courts to award 
“reasonable” attorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party.”30  The Supreme 
Court required courts to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties 
except in limited circumstances.31  To determine whether an attorney 
fee request is “reasonable,” courts compute a “lodestar figure” which 
represents the number of hours “reasonably expended” by the pre-
vailing party’s attorney on the case, multiplied by a “reasonable” 
hourly rate.32  The lodestar figure can still be adjusted upwards for a 
variety of factors, such as payment delays33 and the plaintiff’s “level of 
success.”34  However, awards under the Civil Rights Act permitted 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to receive fee awards greatly disproportionate to 
compensatory damages awards for related but unsuccessful claims, 
and based on “prevailing market rates” even where they usually billed 
at a lower rate. 
Congress became concerned about the amount of attorneys’ fees 
awarded in prisoner litigation and enacted new limitations in the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).35  It established a propor-
 
 28 For an excellent and succinct discussion of attorney fee awards under the Civil Rights Act 
and limits created by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in 
Truth?  The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate Restric-
tions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 CAL. L. REV. 999 (2001). 
 29 The “American Rule” recognizes that the prevailing party in tort litigation must bear 
100% of his own attorneys’ fees.  See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 
U.S. 240 (1975) (describing the “American Rule” practice). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 31 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). 
 32 See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 568 (1986) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–
34). 
 33 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1989). 
 34 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 
 35 The relevant provision of the PLRA provides: 
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or oth-
er correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that— 
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual viola-
tion of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee 
may be awarded under [42 U.S.C. § 1988]; and 
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered 
relief for the violation; or 
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tionality requirement, capped the rate of attorneys’ fees, required 
prisoners receiving a monetary award to pay a percentage of the at-
torneys’ fees, and eliminated attorneys’ fees for related but unsuc-
cessful claims.36 
B.  Assessing Private Enforcement 
Litigation expenses for prisoner lawsuits are much higher for state 
and local governments than for the federal government, given the 
vastly different systems for assessing attorneys’ fees and costs.  In addi-
tion, unlike federally supported efforts to enforce the constitutional 
rights of prisoners (through technical assistance, training, and gov-
ernment civil rights enforcement), private rights of action and the 
taxpayer-funded attorney fee system are not subject to similar ac-
countability systems.  In part, this is because those making the re-
source decisions have distinct motives and do not use the same as-
sessment standards.  Attorneys incurring fees have a financial 
incentive to receive the maximum monetary benefit. 
In addition, federal judges awarding attorneys’ fees use different 
accountability measures than those traditionally applied to govern-
ment programs.  For example, they examine the level of success the 
attorneys achieved for the individual plaintiff or the plaintiff class.  
They do not explicitly consider questions such as whether duplication 
of effort could be avoided, whether the result could have been 
achieved through less expensive means, or whether the attorneys 
 
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief or-
dered for the violation. 
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in para-
graph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied 
to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.  If the 
award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the ex-
cess shall be paid by the defendant. 
(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be 
based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established 
under [18 U.S.C. § 3006A] for payment of court-appointed counsel. 
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from entering into an 
agreement to pay an attorney’s fee in an amount greater than the amount author-
ized under this subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by the 
defendant pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 1988]. 
  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006) (footnotes omitted).  See generally Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 36 For a discussion of the PLRA attorney fee limitations, see Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582 
(7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of the PLRA attorney fee limi-
tations).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-21 (1995), available at 1995 WL 56410, at *28 (describ-
ing Congress’s intent in crafting the attorneys’ fees limits that were ultimately enacted in 
the PLRA). 
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made reasonable efforts to reduce the cost of the litigation.  Nor do 
courts consider competing demands for the government resources 
when awarding government funds in prisoner claims.  Quite simply, 
well-established government funding accountability standards relat-
ing to performance and cost-effectiveness are not considered.  With-
out these tools, the taxpayer funds that underwrite private rights of 
action are unlikely to achieve the maximum public policy benefit in 
the most cost-effective manner. 
There are many types of economic analyses that could be relevant 
to this question, but we do not collect the type of data that would al-
low full-scale economic analyses.  However, there are bright lines that 
can be instructive.  Where, for example, prisoner litigation ends or 
prevents an unconstitutional practice that endangers the lives of in-
mates, and has minimal litigation costs or adverse consequences, then 
one would clearly view the litigation outcome as beneficial to soci-
ety—both in public policy and economic terms.  Likewise, if the liti-
gation achieves no positive changes but uses substantial government 
resources, this would be seen as a negative outcome.  But how do we 
judge institutional prison litigation with outcomes that fall within the 
middle of these bright lines? 
This begs the question:  Should the taxpayer funding that sup-
ports prison civil rights litigation be immune from the same eco-
nomic scrutiny we apply in other areas of public policy?  I think not.  
Private civil rights litigation is funded virtually entirely by state and 
local taxpayers; they expect accountability and the government offi-
cials who represent them should support fiscal responsibility.  In my 
view, the funding of private rights of action, like all public policy 
choices, can and should be assessed to determine:  (1) whether it is 
achieving appropriate public policy goals; (2) whether the cost of the 
enforcement option is worth the benefits it obtains; (3) whether 
there are less costly ways to achieve those same benefits; and (4) 
whether there are more important public goals that could be 
achieved with those resources. 
Quite simply, the costs incurred in prisoner litigation can be ana-
lyzed with commonly used economic concepts.  Some relevant con-
cepts include cost-benefit analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis.  
While these terms do not have one universally accepted definition, 
they can be roughly summarized as follows: 
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• Cost benefit analysis (“CBA”):  CBA is an economic analytic 
tool where one compares the net social benefit of a program 
or intervention to its costs.37 
• Cost effectiveness analysis (“CEA”):  This analytical tool com-
pares two intervention options by assessing the costs and bene-
fits of the two separate programs and then comparing them to 
each other.38  The tool allows policy makers to compare the 
value of two intervention options designed to achieve a par-
ticular result.  Simply expressed, a CEA gives a policy maker 
the information to determine where to get the best result for 
the money. 
In addition, economic analyses often consider “opportunity costs.”  
Opportunity costs are “the value of the best forgone alternative use of 
the resources employed.”39  While we do not collect the data that 
would permit a quantitative analysis of private civil rights actions, 
these analytical tools provide us with a starting point for considering 
these issues. 
 
 37 CBA has been defined in the healthcare context as “[a]n analytic tool for estimating the 
net social benefit of a program or intervention as the incremental benefit of the program 
less the incremental cost, with all benefits and costs measured in dollars.”  COST-
EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 395 (Marthe R. Gold et al. eds., 1996) [hereinaf-
ter COST-EFFECTIVENESS].  Alternatively, in the regulatory context it has been described as 
follows: 
Cost-benefit analysis is a tool developed by economists and scientists to determine 
whether a proposed course of action is efficient compared to alternative courses of 
action.  The costs of a project are typically the time, labor, material, and capital 
expended; the economic value of these resources is measured by their productivity 
if applied to their next best alternative uses (opportunity costs).  The benefits of a 
project are typically defined as the gain in utility of the beneficiary population, of-
ten measured by the stated or observed willingness by the beneficiary population 
to pay for the results of the project.  A project’s net benefits are defined as benefits 
minus costs as compared to a well-specified alternative. 
  Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation:  Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89, 92 (2000) (emphases omitted). 
 38 CEA has been defined in the healthcare context as “[a]n analytic tool in which costs and 
effects of a program and at least one alternative are calculated and presented in a ratio of 
incremental cost to incremental effect.  Effects are [program] outcomes . . . .”  COST-
EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 37, at 395.  Alternatively, CEA has been explained as follows: 
In a cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost of a project is divided by a quantitative (yet 
non-monetary) measure of effectiveness, such as the number of years of human 
life saved or tons of pollution removed.  This produces a cost-effectiveness ratio, 
such as cost per year of life saved or per ton of pollution removed.  Cost-
effectiveness ratios can be used to maximize the number of life years saved (or pol-
lution removed) for a given budget, but it does not inform the choice of the 
budget level.  Cost-effectiveness analysis is used instead of cost-benefit analysis for 
many applications in public health and medicine. 
  Anderson et al., supra note 37, at 93 (citation omitted). 
 39 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 499 n.17 (2002). 
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C.  Valuing the Benefits of Prison Litigation 
While we instinctively view constitutional rights as equal, they 
clearly are not.  Based on my experience, meritorious constitutional 
issues are not weighted similarly in the public policy arena.  The wide 
variation in jury verdicts awarding compensatory damages for civil 
rights violations necessarily implies that juries (as representatives of 
the citizenry) assign different values to different constitutional cases.  
In making monetary damages awards (for compensatory and punitive 
damages), juries can consider issues such as the nature of the egre-
giousness of the constitutional violation, the harm inflicted by it, the 
damages suffered by the plaintiff, and the likelihood that it will reoc-
cur in the future. 
In our system, juries inevitably make value judgments about the 
worth of the constitutional claim.  In this context, it is likely, for ex-
ample, that constitutional violations that severely affect the health 
and safety of inmates would tend to be viewed as more critical than, 
for example, issues involving prisoner privacy rights.40  In addition, 
injunction litigation that is designed to prevent future constitutional 
violations for many prisoners would be viewed as more beneficial 
than a nominal damage claim for a one-time, non-recurring event. 
For these types of constitutional issues, public policy considera-
tions suggest that one would be willing to pay more money and suffer 
more adverse consequences (or costs) to achieve a litigation outcome 
that prevents future constitutional violations that affect health and 
safety issues.  At the same time, high litigation costs and adverse op-
erational effects of litigation would not seem to justify constitutional 
litigation that is unlikely to prevent future constitutional violations or 
which is disproportionate to the constitutional harm prevented.  I be-
lieve that, as a matter of public policy, the public costs should not 
 
 40 It is not surprising that different values can be assigned to constitutional issues.  In the 
difficult arena of healthcare and cost containment, experts have tried to assign quantita-
tive values to the difficult issues surrounding health status and individual concerns and 
preferences.  In 1993, the U.S. Public Health Service created a panel to address standard-
izing cost-effectiveness analyses in health and medicine.  The panel recommended guide-
lines that capture various states of health, as well as the use of Quality-Adjusted-Life-Years 
(“QALYs”) to rank various health interventions.  In this context, “cost-utility analysis” 
(“CUA”) was proposed to: 
value[] health status in terms of health preferences, desires, or utilities; the QALY 
index combines preferences for length of life with those for quality of life.  Like 
most utility measures, QALYs are based on the premise that utilities of different 
individuals and health conditions can compare on a single quantitative scale. 
  Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice:  Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics, 
Policy and Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 414 (2006). 
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greatly exceed the constitutional benefits obtained, the costs to attain 
that goal should be minimized (to the extent possible), and we must 
consider whether there are better uses for the resources spent on the 
litigation.41 
D.  Forces that Affect Litigation Outcomes 
In my view, if one wants to understand the potential “costs” of 
prisoner litigation, then it is important to understand the forces that 
drive prison litigation, the likely outcomes of litigation, and the im-
pacts of those outcomes.  Clearly, the underlying merits of a particu-
lar civil rights claim will directly impact the likely outcome of prison 
litigation.  Meritless claims are usually strongly defended.  While no-
minal settlements can be a routine way for governments to end the 
case and save on litigation costs, sometimes prison agencies adopt re-
strictive settlement policies (based on the view that routine settle-
ments in non-meritorious cases simply encourage more lawsuits and, 
in the long run, do not save the government money). 
Where, however, a prison system is engaging in an unconstitu-
tional policy or practice that affects many prisoners, this can often 
lead to a federal civil rights action filed as a class action by experi-
enced prisoners’ rights lawyers.  These institutional class actions usu-
ally seek substantive changes in how a prison system manages its pris-
oners.  Sometimes, prison officials can successfully defend these 
actions and win outright.  More often, however, the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys have chosen a strong case where they believe they can prove an 
unconstitutional practice or condition.  When faced with a strong 
lawsuit challenging an unconstitutional practice, the prison officials 
usually fix the problem—they can choose to make changes during 
the course of the litigation, they can agree to the changes as part of a 
settlement, or they can be required to make changes by court order. 
 
 41 Although there are advocates who might argue that the public should underwrite any 
litigation necessary to prevent constitutional violations, such a proposal is unrealistic.  
Harms to individuals in our society, whether they be constitutional violations, criminal 
victimization, or torts, are necessarily ranked in our judicial system.  Our civil justice sys-
tem provides a process for assigning a monetary value for past civil harms, such as consti-
tutional violations and torts.  Thus in deciding compensatory damages, factfinders con-
sider issues such as pain and suffering, loss of future earnings, loss of the ability to 
participate fully in life, and emotional injuries.  In criminal cases, sentences can include 
loss of liberty, fines, and restitution based on considerations such as physical harm to the 
victim, emotional injuries, the intent of the criminal defendant, the need for specific and 
general deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. 
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Courts can, and should, ensure that the prison practices are con-
forming to the constitutional minimum.  However, sometimes the 
prison officials make changes that provide prisoners with more than 
is required by the Constitution.  As will be discussed more fully later, 
this can occur in a variety of ways.  To understand why this occurs re-
quires one to assess the various forces that can drive particular out-
comes in institutional litigation involving prisons. 
E.  Litigant Goals 
In prisoner litigation, the basic goals of the litigation participants 
are easily understood.  In the most simplistic terms, inmates may seek 
to improve prison conditions to prevent future harm from occurring 
to them or other inmates.  They may seek the vindication of a court 
order confirming they were treated badly or punishment for the offi-
cials who they believe have done them wrong.  They often seek finan-
cial compensation. 
Defendants in litigation usually want to minimize financial losses 
from adverse judgments.  As professionals, they usually do not want 
their reputations sullied by explicit judicial finding of wrong-doing.  
And they usually want to avoid the burdens of litigation—they do not 
want to testify and they want to reduce the litigation burdens on their 
institution. 
F.  Other Litigation Participants 
But the named parties are not the only persons driving litigation.  
Attorneys representing both sides also have a substantial ability to af-
fect the course of the litigation and its impact on prison policies and 
practices, as well as government resources.  For example, government 
attorneys usually advise prison officials on ways to reduce future liti-
gation risks or policy changes that can help reduce the likelihood of 
future injunctions. 
In prisoner class actions, the underlying litigation goals for the 
plaintiff class are often driven by the attorneys.  Institutional litigation 
can be used by advocates as a way to achieve benefits for prisoners 
that exceed the constitutional minimum and that could not be ob-
tained through the state or local political process.  While there are 
some limits on attorney decisions on behalf of the plaintiff class, 
there is still considerable leeway in the choice of issues to pursue and  
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whether to use strong plaintiff claims as a basis to negotiate for 
changes that are not constitutionally required.42 
Judges, likewise, have a substantial impact on the litigation.  With-
in the appropriate confines of their position, judges can exert con-
siderable pressure on litigants to settle cases.  The pressure of increas-
ing dockets ensures that judges will seek to have parties settle cases or 
narrow issues before a trial.  Court-supported alternative dispute reso-
lution and mediation are a routine part of prison litigation.  Inevita-
bly, however, the settlement position of the parties depends upon 
their beliefs about the receptiveness of the judge (or jury) to their 
relative positions, and the potential costs and risk of future litiga-
tion.43 
In addition to advocating on behalf of their clients, attorneys also 
have financial interests.  Because the Civil Rights Act authorizes at-
torneys’ fees for successful prisoner litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
understandably seek to be compensated for their time.  Government 
attorneys, likewise, do not work for free.  Attorneys for both sides 
usually try to obtain what is the best result possible while minimizing 
adverse impacts for their clients. 
G.  Mixed Government Motives 
But plaintiffs and prison officials can have common interests.  
When institutional prison litigation was in its early stages, many pris-
on officials who wanted to improve prison conditions saw the litiga-
tion as a means to obtain more resources for their institutions.  Con-
sent decrees, which were common in the 1970s and 1980s, allowed 
 
 42 There are, of course, limits on the settlement of class actions.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (set-
ting rules for class actions). 
 43 But judges can also have other impacts on cases.  Judges, for example, exercise consider-
able discretion as to when to seek pro bono representation on behalf of a single prisoner 
or a group of pro se prisoners seeking class certification.  Judges have the power to ap-
point counsel who can convert a small, easily defendable lawsuit into a massive class ac-
tion with tremendous financial and operational consequences. 
   Judges, likewise, retain the ability to appoint special masters in prison litigation.  The 
use of monitors and special masters has diminished somewhat since the passage of the 
PLRA, which limited special masters’ roles and compensation.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) 
(2006).  However, the use of special masters and monitors still continues.  These special 
masters and court monitors are usually paid on an hourly basis and can have a financial 
interest in the continuation of litigation.  Corrections officials have complained to Con-
gress that the PLRA has not done enough to curb problems with court-appointed moni-
tors.  See Letter from Martin F. Horn, Comm’r of the N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Prob., to 
Chairman John Conyers and Rep. Lamar Smith, Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Apr. 10, 2008) (on file with author) (relating to House Report 
4109 and proposed amendments to the PLRA). 
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government officials to agree to court orders requiring them to pro-
vide services or facility improvements.  These agreements sometimes 
required prison officials to meet minimum constitutional standards.  
More often than not, the plaintiffs would give up claims for substan-
tial damages in order to obtain long-term agreements for improved 
conditions.  For the parties to the litigation, this was a solution that 
remedied the problem while ensuring that future government fund-
ing would be allocated for these improvements. 
For prison officials, these agreements could be very helpful, cer-
tainly in the short term.  The problems would be fixed, there would 
be no findings that the particular administrator had committed any 
wrongdoing, and the administrator now had a leg up in future inter-
nal government funding negotiations.  Nothing ensured future fund-
ing better that the threat of federal contempt orders and fines.44 
H.  Other Government Actors 
But for government officials who were not parties to the litigation, 
the agreements and court orders entered in prison litigation cases of-
ten proved problematic.  New political administrations often found 
themselves saddled with agreements and court orders entered before 
they took office.45  Consent decrees frequently contained provisions 
that exceeded the constitutional minimum, yet the new officials were 
saddled with the policy choices of the prior administration and obli-
gated to fund these particular programs or facility enhancements.  
Agreements made during times of government surpluses might have 
looked good then, but when times and budgets became lean, gov-
ernment officials found themselves questioning whether they should 
be bound by the old agreements. 
In addition to problems encountered by new political administra-
tions, other government officials often expressed concerns about the 
impact of prison litigation.  Legislators responsible for funding new 
construction, staff, or programs raised concerns about agreements 
that bound the appropriators to funding particular provisions.  
Sometimes prison administrators attempted to control prison popula-
 
 44 For an excellent discussion of the factors that led many prison officials to enter into long-
term consent decrees, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Politics of Consent:  Party Incentives in 
Institutional Reform in Consent Decrees, in CONSENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  POLICY ISSUES IN 
CONSENT DECREES 13–37 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006), available at http://www.princeton.
edu/prior/publicatons/docs/consent.pdf. 
 45 See Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections?  Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from 
Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295. 
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tions and fiscal costs by consenting to or acquiescing in orders pro-
hibiting the housing of certain classes of inmates.46  Prison officials 
required to take custody of these inmates often opposed these orders.  
Similarly, prosecutors would oppose orders releasing pretrial and 
sentenced inmates. 
The issue becomes even more difficult when civil rights litigation 
is used to obtain policy changes that are not constitutionally re-
quired.  There are all sorts of harms faced by the public at large that 
require difficult criminal justice policy choices by elected officials.  A 
decision to reduce a police force can mean more violent crime suf-
fered by the public, while a decision to increase a police force can 
mean less funding for offender education or drug treatment pro-
grams.  The decision becomes even more complex when other public 
policy goals (outside of the criminal justice system) are considered.  
The government budget process involves difficult policy choices 
about whether to invest in criminal justice, schooling, transportation 
systems, medical treatment, services for the elderly, or economic im-
provements.  Other government actors are thus likely to be con-
cerned about the opportunity costs of prisoner litigation. 
IV.  EVALUATING COMPETING INTERESTS 
Analyzing prisoner litigation from a public policy point of view re-
quires one to look beyond the motivations of the individual litigants 
and participants.  Institutional prisoner litigation that changes prison 
policies and procedures is ultimately underwritten by the taxpayer.  
Tax dollars always pay for the government lawyers, the time and ef-
fort of the prison officials to defend the litigation, the judge, and the 
court staff.  In addition, tax dollars pay for the monetary damages, 
the attorneys’ fees, and the costs of institutional changes resulting 
from the litigation. 
Assessing the value of prisoner litigation from the public policy 
point of view requires one to assess the various effects of the litiga-
tion, whether those effects are viewed as desirable, and the relative 
costs and benefits of those changes.  From the public policy perspec-
tive, government obviously should:  (1) discourage negative effects of 
litigation; and (2) ensure compliance with the Constitution.  How-
ever, this is not the end of the inquiry.  Even if one determines that 
 
 46 See Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001) (challenging successfully the 
county officials’ agreement to an injunction limiting the number of state prisoners the 
county jail could detain). 
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litigation has led to constitutional compliance, the question then be-
comes whether this worthy goal was accomplished in a cost-effective 
manner that minimized collateral adverse consequences. 
The more difficult question is whether, from a public policy view, 
it is desirable for federal civil rights litigation to lead to non-
constitutionally required changes that benefit prisoners.  This issue, 
too, involves balancing public policy and economic interests.  In addi-
tion, prisoner litigation in the federal courts can result in inherently 
governmental decisions (with substantial policy, operational, and fi-
nancial implications) being made outside of the normal governmen-
tal decision-making process.  In these cases, there are substantial pub-
lic policy questions about when, if ever, it is appropriate to 
circumvent the checks and balances of state and local governments or 
the decisions of democratically elected leaders.47 
However, when assessing the ultimate value of such changes, one 
needs to identify the positive and adverse consequences of the 
change (costs and benefits), whether there were other options for 
achieving the positives and reducing the negatives (cost-
effectiveness), and whether there were other, more important goals 
that could have been achieved with those government resources (op-
portunity costs). 
A.  Positive Extra-Constitutional Changes 
Some positive policy and practice changes could, for example, re-
duce the risk of injuries to inmates or staff (through improved in-
mate classification, mental health treatment, or weapons detection) 
or reduce the risk of recidivism (through proven programs such as 
drug treatment or cognitive behavioral therapy).  Viewed by them-
selves, these changes in policies or practices are certainly valuable to 
the prisoners, but they are also valuable to society as whole.  At the 
same time, when such policies and practices exceed the constitu-
tional minimum, there are legitimate questions about whether the 
cost of those changes is justified if there are other options for achiev-
ing the same benefit (cost-effectiveness), or if there are other, more 
important, uses for those government resources (opportunity costs). 
 
 47 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:  WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003). 
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B.  Adverse Consequences 
Adverse consequences negatively affect prison operations, prison-
ers, and the public.  Adverse operational impacts can include, for ex-
ample, whether the change will reduce the safety of correctional offi-
cers, whether it will reduce management flexibility in staff 
assignments, or whether staff will feel disempowered to suggest better 
ways to accomplish a goal. 
At the same time, changes can have unintended negative effects 
on prisoners.  For example, a change that protects inmate privacy is-
sues may have the unintended effect of making it easier for predatory 
inmates to carry weapons.  Changes designed to protect inmate reli-
gious practices can inadvertently make it easier for white supremacists 
organized under a religious banner to operate within the prison.48 
Likewise, some operational changes can have negative effects on 
public opinion.  Changes designed to give prisoners added benefits 
can negatively affect public opinion about the prison.  If citizens be-
lieve that persons convicted of crimes should not enjoy the same pri-
vileges as law-abiding citizens, changes that excessively benefit pris-
oners will likely be viewed as inappropriate.49  Negative public 
perceptions about the competence of a government institution can 
ultimately affect the programs run by that institution.  In the criminal 
justice system, negative perceptions about a prison’s administration 
can adversely affect its work, such as by creating hurdles for obtaining 
government funding for essential programs or reducing credibility 
with its parole recommendations. 
In addition, in the analysis, one needs to consider the financial 
costs of the litigation itself.  While the plaintiff and the attorney see 
monetary payments and attorney fee awards as a benefit, this is a neg-
ative on the public balance sheet.  Tax dollars pay for virtually the en-
tire cost of the litigation.  Government staff resources are also re-
quired for the litigation. 
Finally, settlements or injunctions can have additional economic 
consequences.  These can include, for example, the cost of new con-
 
 48 See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:  RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 158 (2005) 
(describing prisoners seeking religious accommodations for racist literature). 
 49 For example, when a television show aired about an inmate-led musical group, the prison 
system was inundated with public and media criticism.  Following the criticism, the prison 
halted the musical group program.  The inmates sued and eventually lost on all claims.  
See Young v. Beard, No. 04-2211, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6950 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2007) 
(mem.).  If prison officials had agreed to this program following the litigation, they cer-
tainly could have expected the same sort of outcry. 
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struction or physical plant renovations, staff costs (hiring, salaries, or 
overtime), or equipment purchases. 
V.  CASE EXAMPLE:  THE BOWERS LITIGATION 
The basic facts in the Bowers litigation are not in dispute.  The 
Philadelphia prison population was at an all-time high.  The popula-
tion continued to rise.  The Mayor’s Office had rejected the Prison 
Commissioner’s request for a new, 400-bed intake facility. 
As a result, the Prison Commissioner initiated a policy he called 
“Operations Strategic Admissions” (“OSA”) as a prison population 
control measure.50  As an alternative to converting existing prison 
space into additional prison beds, he allowed the Intake Unit popula-
tion to increase and then notified Philadelphia criminal justice 
stakeholders that there would be a delay in the admission of most 
newly arrested detainees who were awaiting transportation from tem-
porary police detention facilities.51 
This population control measure resulted in prisoners being 
housed for extended periods of time in the temporary detention fa-
cilities.  In June and July of 2006, numerous detainees were packed 
into holding cells for several days with many other prisoners.52  They 
were detained in those temporary detention cells for extended peri-
ods without beds, and with inadequate space to sit or lie down, no 
bedding, inadequate sanitation, and no hygienic supplies.  Some in-
mates did not receive medical care.  In addition to these conditions, 
many police detention facilities had fire safety problems, including 
blocked fire exits and inadequate fire safety equipment and evacua-
tion procedures.53 
On July 24, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a civil rights action against the 
police and prison officials, challenging the conditions of confine-
ment in the police holding cells and prison intake areas.54  The plain-
 
 50 See Transcript of Record at 105–06, Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-3229, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Bowers Docket]. 
 51 Id. at 105–15. 
 52 The extensive testimony relating to those actual holding cell conditions in the summer of 
2006 is described in Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804, at *23–60. 
 53 The plaintiffs presented three expert witnesses:  Glenn Corbett, who testified as to the 
current fire safety at the Police Administration Building, Bowers Docket, supra note 50, at 
4–91; F. Warren Benton, who testified as to the general conditions (including sanitation) 
at the Police Administration Building and two police districts (the 24th/25th, and 9th), 
id. at 4–89; and Robert L. Cohen, who testified as to medical issues, id. at 5–55. 
 54 See Complaint at 1, Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 (No. 06-CV-3229).  The plaintiffs 
named as defendants:  the City of Philadelphia; Leon A. King, II, the Commissioner of 
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tiffs also sought a preliminary injunction.55  With these filings, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the Philadelphia Prison System was “over-
crowded,” causing specific unconstitutional conditions of confine-
ment in the police detention facilities that housed persons newly ar-
rested for criminal offenses and in the intake facilities at the 
Philadelphia Prison System.  This complaint (and later amended 
complaint) sought monetary damages, declaratory relief, a prelimi-
nary injunction, a permanent injunction, and attorneys’ fees.56 
The plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction also sought to address a 
wide range of issues, including medical care, screening, medication, 
access to legal counsel, “habitable” cells, showers, toilets, personal hy-
giene items, personal protection, and time limits for the length of 
stay.57  Because the plaintiffs also sought prisoner releases and the re-
striction of cell capacities, the Philadelphia District Attorney success-
fully moved to intervene pursuant to the PLRA.58 
On September 11, 2006, the OSA was halted by order of the City’s 
Managing Director.59  One month later, the federal district court held 
an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction request.  In 
January 2007, the court issued a ninety-day preliminary injunction 
and a declaratory judgment.  The court found that the defendants 
had committed constitutional violations in the confinement of the 
detainees. 
The ninety-day preliminary injunction provided, among other 
things, for limitations on cell capacity and detention time for post-
arraignment detainees in police facilities, and for cell capacity limits 
 
the Philadelphia Prisons; Sylvester Johnson, the Philadelphia Police Commissioner; and 
unknown police and prison officials (“City Defendants”).  Id. 
 55 See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 
(No. 06-CV-3229). 
 56 See Amended Complaint at 18, Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 (No. 06-CV-3229). 
 57 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1–
2, Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 (No. 06-CV-3229). 
 58 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).  Under the PLRA, prosecutors have the right to intervene in 
prison conditions litigation that seeks a “prisoner release order.”  Id. § 3626(a)(3)(F).  A 
“prisoner release order” is broadly defined to include “any order . . . that has the purpose 
or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or 
nonadmission of prisoners to a prison.”  Id. § 3626(g)(4).  Philadelphia District Attorney 
Lynne Abraham filed a motion to intervene under this section.  See Motion of District At-
torney Lynne Abraham to Intervene Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act at 1, 
Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804 (No. 06-CV-3229).  Judge Surrick granted this inter-
vention motion.  Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-3229, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
64651 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006). 
 59 See Bowers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5804, at *25. 
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at the PPS Intake Unit.60  In addition, it required the City to under-
take various fire safety improvements at the police districts.  The pre-
liminary injunction was later extended, with some modifications.61  
The court later recommended that the parties agree to a private set-
tlement.  After the plaintiffs and city defendants entered into a pri-
vate settlement agreement, the court terminated the preliminary in-
junction.62  While the case is still pending, there are currently no 
injunction orders or pending motions for injunctive relief. 
A.  The Costs of the Bowers Litigation 
While it is difficult to quantify all of the “costs” that have resulted 
from the Bowers litigation, there are some clear costs to the public.  
From a financial point of view, taxpayers paid for: 
• Direct Litigation Costs 
– Federal Court Resources:  These would include a portion of the 
salary and benefits of the persons needed to manage and 
adjudicate the litigation.  (This would include the federal judge, 
his law clerk, his courtroom deputy, the court reporter, the clerical 
staff, the staff in the Clerk’s Office, and the Marshall’s Office that 
provided courtroom and cell room security during the preliminary 
injunction hearing.) 
– The Legal Defense:  City taxpayers would have paid for a portion 
of the salary and benefits for attorneys and clerical staff in the City 
Solicitor’s Office and the District Attorney’s Office.  In addition, 
the City paid for outside attorneys to represent the City 
defendants. 
– The Plaintiffs’ Attorneys:  The City paid out approximately 
$300,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 
– The Monetary Settlements for Individual Plaintiffs:  So far, all but 
two of the plaintiffs have settled their claims.  The remaining 
plaintiffs seek significant monetary compensation. 
– Defendant Agency Litigation Costs:  As part of the litigation, the 
Philadelphia Prison System and Police Department incurred costs 
in document production, facility tours, and depositions. 
• Costs Resulting from Injunctions 
– Fire Safety Improvements (costing over $1,000,000). 
– Prison Operational Costs (relating to intake processing and 
classification). 
 
 60 See id. at *122. 
 61 See Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-3229, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75548 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 10, 2007). 
 62 Id. 
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• Benefits of Litigation 
– Compensation to Plaintiffs Whose Rights Were Violated. 
– Improved Fire Safety. 
– Stopping the OSA and Its Crowding (in PPS and police holding 
cells). 
– Preventing a Future OSA. 
B.  Evaluating Bowers from a Cost-Benefit Analysis Perspective 
From a constitutional perspective, Bowers achieved two major 
goals.  It directly led to the City making substantial improvements to 
Police Department holding cell facilities to ensure appropriate fire 
safety equipment, practices, and policies.  At the same time, it directly 
led to the Managing Director ordering the Prison Commissioner to 
halt the OSA practice which had led to the unconstitutional condi-
tions in the intake facilities and police holding cells.  To achieve 
these goals, the Bowers litigation cost the taxpayers approximately 
$3,000,000.63 
C.  Evaluating Bowers from a Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Perspective 
Even presuming that the goals obtained in Bowers were worth 
$3,000,000, the question becomes whether these same positive out-
comes could have been achieved at a lower price.  In my view, they 
could have.  Most of the litigation costs here were incurred after the 
Managing Director halted the OSA practice.  Despite this, there was 
extensive litigation of that issue.  The practice did not resume after 
the preliminary injunctions ended. 
The fire safety issues, however, persisted after the OSA ended.  It 
is unclear whether the fire safety issue could have been settled with-
out the preliminary injunction litigation.  I suspect that it could have. 
This also raises the question, from a government perspective, 
about whether the private litigation route was the most cost-effective 
way to achieve the public policy goals.  From the City’s perspective, 
there were other alternatives.  Effective government leadership 
should have been able to identify the constitutional issues before they 
led to litigation.  For example, competent correctional professionals 
should have known that it was unconstitutional to crowd the intake 
and holding cells for the purpose of limiting the overall prison popu-
lation.  In addition, police management certainly should have been 
 
 63 This estimate is based on my review of the various costs outlined above and my discus-
sions with counsel for the City.  
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aware of the fire safety issues.  From the City’s perspective, investing 
in strong leadership to prevent such violations and litigation is the 
more cost-effective way to prevent these types of constitutional viola-
tions. 
However, from an overall public policy perspective, there are 
times when effective government leadership fails and litigation is re-
quired to compel recalcitrant local officials to comply with the consti-
tutional requirements.  The issue then becomes whether there are 
less expensive ways to compel government compliance.  This case 
shows that there are.  In Bowers, the plaintiff’s attorneys continued to 
bill the City at a rate as high as $450 per hour for work relating to the 
OSA but undertaken after the OSA was halted.64  This strongly sug-
gests that these additional costs were not necessary to halt the consti-
tutional violation.65 
Candidly, the financial costs of the Bowers litigation are not as high 
as those reported by other jurisdictions.  California has experienced 
huge costs relating to its class action litigation involving prisons.  
Even after the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act attorney 
fee limits, California has paid out over $47,000,000 in just six class ac-
tions involving prisons.66  Despite this whopping cost, California has 
very little control over the issues plaintiffs’ attorneys choose to pur-
sue, their post-judgment monitoring efforts, and it is unable to re-
quire them to pursue cost-effective strategies designed to save tax-
payer dollars. 
D.  Evaluating Bowers from an Opportunity Cost Perspective 
In addition, when one considers the costs involved in the litiga-
tion, one has to consider the lost opportunity costs for state and local 
governments.  For example, in the Bowers litigation, the prisoners’ at-
torneys received $250,000 to litigate the preliminary injunction, and 
 
 64 The plaintiffs’ attorneys contended that they were not bound by the PLRA attorney fee 
rate since the suit was filed by some non-prisoners. 
 65 The plaintiffs’ attorneys contended that the further litigation and continued orders were 
necessary to halt a recurrence of the constitutional violations.  However, these constitu-
tional violations did not resume after the preliminary injunction ended. 
 66 Specifically, as of March 2008, California has paid $18,491,763.23 in the Armstrong class 
action, $6,664,070.64 in the Valdivia class action, $6,627,422.61 in the Clark class action, 
$6,437,144.70 in the Plata class action, $5,501,464.76 in the Madrid class action (including 
special master fees), and $3,600,744.23 in the Farrell class action.  E-mail and attached 
spreadsheet from an attorney with the California Department of Justice to author (April 
28, 2008) (on file with author).   
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more fees for monitoring the preliminary injunctions.  In addition, 
the City incurred substantial costs in defending the litigation. 
These legal fees could have been spent on other City purposes.  
For example, would the prisoners have received a greater benefit if 
the money had been spent on drug treatment?  The money also 
could have also been spent for other criminal justice purposes.  For 
example, at the very point when the prisoners’ attorneys were seeking 
this $250,000 payment, I was also seeking $250,000 in funds to pay for 
City police investigators to solve 200 open rape cases.  In each of 
these cases, a DNA profile had been extracted from evidence ob-
tained from the rape victim’s sexual assault examination.  The City 
needed to pay for detective overtime to complete the investigations 
so that the perpetrators could be arrested.  In the context of the Bow-
ers attorney fee award, the City now lacked the $250,000 for expendi-
tures like those needed to solve those 200 rape cases. 
VI.  ARE THERE OPTIONS? 
Overall, from the point of view of total taxpayer dollars (federal, 
state, and local), there may be more cost-effective ways to enforce 
these types of constitutional protections when faced with a recalci-
trant state or local government.  Certainly, various options have pros 
and cons.  But, at the very least, we ought to be considering whether 
there are better and more fiscally responsible ways to achieve the 
benefits of institutional prisoner litigation.  Given the vastly disparate 
attorney fees systems for federal prisoners versus state or local prison-
ers, there is certainly reason to reconsider this approach. 
One should consider, for example, whether other enforcement 
mechanisms in large institutional class actions, such as technical assis-
tance, investigation, and legal suit (if necessary) by the Civil Rights 
Division, would be as costly as the current system.  I cannot imagine 
that the Civil Rights Division’s work in this area would begin to ap-
proach the costs found in California.  While the Civil Rights Division 
has a limited role in civil rights enforcement, this is, in part, because 
it counts on private rights of action.  We need to consider whether a 
system of increased federal agency enforcement would be a more 
cost-effective way to enforce these rights in large institutional lawsuits. 
This type of enforcement has additional benefits.  The federal 
government is financially accountable through existing accountability 
measures.  There is also political accountability over the types of ac-
tions they bring, which presumably should focus on the substantial 
constitutional issues.  In addition, they are scrutinized by Congress 
over whether they are creating undue financial and operational bur-
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dens for state and local governments.  This type of accountability 
simply is not present in the private causes of actions. 
In addition, are the different attorneys’ fees systems for federal 
prisoners versus state and local prisoners achieving their desired 
goals?  Are the federal fees too low and therefore failing to support 
litigation essential to protect the rights of federal prisoners?  Are the 
state and local fees systems too high given the benefits obtained and 
cost-effectiveness considerations?  Without any meaningful congres-
sional oversight or data collection, these issues are difficult to resolve. 
Alternatively, Congress could consider additional controls and 
oversight of attorneys’ fees and costs in private rights of action.  While 
Congress did much in this area with the PLRA attorney fee limita-
tions, it could do more.  It could, for example, require courts to con-
sider cost-effectiveness issues and opportunity costs as part of the at-
torneys’ fees award process. 
In the meantime, Congress has created this unfunded mandate 
for expending state and local tax dollars without any systematic me-
thod of federal oversight.  There are no reports required by the fed-
eral government on attorneys’ fees awards (by court order or settle-
ment) in prisoner cases.  Nor are there oversight hearings or audits.  
Quite simply, the federal courts lack the standards or resources to en-
sure the level of accountability that one should expect with such large 
expenditures of taxpayer dollars.  At the very least, Congress could 
start to get a handle on this issue by collecting information on the at-
torneys’ fees and costs obtained from state and local governments 
pursuant to federal civil rights statutes.  With data, Congress would 
have a much better understanding of the costs associated by its attor-
neys’ fees statute and prisoner litigation against state and local gov-
ernments. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Private rights of action have an important place in our current sys-
tem.  While we support the enforcement of constitutional rights for 
prisoners, we should not disregard the obligation we owe taxpayers to 
ensure fiscal accountability with public funds.  These worthy goals are 
not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
